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The Future of Societal Constitutionalism in
the Age of Acceleration
RICCARDO PRANDINI*
ABSTRACT
The aim of this article is to reframe the debate on societal
constitutionalism and constitutionalization from a spatial to a temporal
framework. This analytical shift is due to the dramatic acceleration of
societal processes, which are increasingly crossing the spatial boundaries
of nation-states and of all the other social structures embedded in
peculiar places. This high-speed society is characterized by the so-called
temporalization of complexity, which influences every aspect of social life
and, in particular, the "validity" of law. On the basis of this theoretical
background, I would like to show that changing the form of observation
from a spatial to a temporal framework may help in understanding the
future of constitutionalism in a different and creative way. To cite some
of the examples presented in this article, such shifts in the form of
observation could help us to reconsider: (a) why so many scholars prefer
now to talk about 'orocesses" of constitutionalization instead of
constitutions as "structures'" (b) the growing relevance of courts instead
of legislative bodies for processes of global constitutionalization; (c) the
blurring or vanishing of the modern distinction between pouvoir
constituant/pouvoir constitu6; and (d) the fundamental role of human
rights and dignity within the processes of global constitutionalization.
The temporalization of constitutions could help us to understand and
foresee a new and emerging ideal of societal constitutionalism in which
the processes and structures of the structural coupling between (not
national) polities and law are open to the challenges of a hyper-complex
world society.
"Sleep faster, Comrade"
Soviet Joke
* Riccardo Prandini is Associate Professor of Sociology at the School of Political
Sciences, University of Bologna. Correspondence to riccardo.prandini@unibo.it
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Horizon: "an apparent line separating the sky from the earth,
(which retreats as one approaches it)"
Oxford English Dictionary
I. TEMPUS FUGIT! MODERN CONSTITUTIONS AS IDEAL AND PROGRESSIVE
LEGAL-POLITICAL DEVICES
What is the right time for constitutionalism and the global
emergence of civil global constitutions? Is our time a good time for
global constitutionalism? How are the past, the present, and the future
of constitutions bound together (or not)? Can we still observe a stable
identity between modern constitutions and present-day ones? These are
some of the many questions we could ask in order to reframe the subject
of constitutionalism within the boundaries of a time perspective.'
Puzzlingly enough, the huge and increasingly specialized debate on
global constitutions has never clearly focused on the concept of "time."
Yet, the most modern constitutions emerged during a revolutionary and
groundbreaking time (revolution as "accelerated" history)2 in which law
and politics evolved in opposition to their traditional and customary
features. Modernity itself is a Neuzeit, a denaturalized time, 3 a time
subjected to the "law of acceleration,"4 where everything changes faster
than could ever have been expected.5
For Hermann Lubbe, one of the most quoted scholars in the debate
about acceleration, modern time is characterized by the "contraction of
the present." He distinguishes the past as that which no longer holds/is
no longer valid, while he identifies the future as that which does not yet
hold/is not yet valid. He denotes the present as the time span for which
the horizons of experience and expectation coincide. Only if this
coincidence is valid can we use the present as a compass for the future.
1. See generally THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? (Petra Dobner & Martin
Loughlin eds., 2010).
2. See generally Reinhart Koselleck, Is There an Acceleration of History?, in
HIGH-SPEED SOCIETY: SOCIAL ACCELERATION, POWER, AND MODERNITY 113 (Hartmut Rosa
& William E. Scheuerman eds., 2009).
3. See generally REINHART KOSELLECK, FUTURES PAST: ON THE SEMANTICS OF
HISTORICAL TIME 222-54 (Keith Tribe trans., Colum. Univ. Press 2004) (1979).
4. Henry Adams, a historian and literary man, grasped the centrality of social
acceleration. In 1904, he formulated a 'law of acceleration," posing the question of what
significance tradition and past history might come to possess in high-speed society. See
generally THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1918).
5. The following sources provide an introduction to the relevance of acceleration and
provide a bibliography collection. See generally HARTMUT ROSA, ALIENATION AND
ACCELERATION: TOWARDS A CRITICAL THEORY OF LATE-MODERN TEMPORALITY (2010)
[hereinafter ALIENATION]; Hartmut Rosa & William E. Scheuerman, Introduction to
HIGH-SPEED SOCIETY: SOCIAL ACCELERATION, POWER, AND MODERNITY, supra note 2, at 1.
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Social acceleration can be defined by an increase in the decay rates of
the reliability of experiences and expectations and by the contraction of
time spans definable as the present, or, in simpler terms, as the
quantity of innovations per unit of time in every social domain: "In a
dynamic civilization, the quantity of civilizational elements that are still
contemporary, but already on the verge of being out of date or
antiquated, increases. Put differently, the non-contemporaneity of the
contemporary increases in dynamic civilization."6
Reinhart Koselleck, the most important observer of temporal
semantics, believed that since the French and Industrial Revolutions,
social structures are changing faster than before, and structural change
itself has become an "event": structures become an event ("die
Strukturen werden zum Ereignis').7 This accelerated historical time has
led modern Western societies toward a growing separation between the
"space of experiences" and the "horizon of expectations," where the
former becomes increasingly "poor," short, and incapable of cultural
consolidation, and the latter becomes distant, not deducible, and
inaccessible: the future, conceived as horizon, cannot become the
present, because it slips into a future past.8 As Niklas Luhmann has
said, "the future cannot begin," 9 and modernity has to face the problem
"of assimilating experiences which could no longer be inferred from
previous experience; and thus, accordingly, the formulation of
expectations which could not have been nurtured previously." 0 Within
modernity, time began to accelerate and social acceleration, defined as
"an increase in the decay rates of the reliability of experiences and
expectations and by the contraction of the time spans definable as the
'present'[,]"" became the problem. This acceleration was also
fundamental for constitutions and constitutionalism because historically
they represented a clear "vision" of progress, i.e, a tendency to link the
present with the future, the immanence with the transcendence, the
6. Hermann Lilbbe, The Contraction of the Present, in HIGH-SPEED SOCIETY: SOCIAL
ACCELERATION, POWER, AND MODERNITY, supra note 2, at 159, 161.
7. See generally REINHART KOSELLECK, Die unbekannte Zukunft und die Kunst der
Prognose [The Unknown Future and the Art of Prognosis], in ZEITSCHICHTEN: STUDIEN ZUR
HISTORIK [TIME-LAYERS: STUDIES ON THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY] 203, 221 (2000) (Ger.).
8. See generally KOSELLECK, supra note 3, at 255-76.
9. Niklas Luhmann, The Future Cannot Begin: Temporal Structures in Modern
Society, 43 SOC. RES. 130 (1976).
10. KOSELLECK, supra note 3, at 268.
11. Hartmut Rosa, Social Acceleration: Ethical and Political Consequences of a
Desynchronized High-Speed Society, in HIGH-SPEED SOCIETY: SOCIAL ACCELERATION,
POWER, AND MODERNITY, supra note 2, at 83-84.
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earth with the sky to touch the horizon. 12 For the same reason,
Koselleck precisely underlined that
[a]ll concepts of movement share a compensatory effect,
which they produce. The lesser the experiential
substance, the greater the expectations joined to it. The
lesser the experience, the greater the expectation: this is
a formula for the temporal structure of the modern, to
the degree that it is rendered a concept by 'progress.' 13
Modern constitutionalism was, accordingly, a way to "idealize" and
"project" into the future a new form of coupling between law and
politics: law became positive law, speeding up procedures to fix and
change itself through auto-reference; politics lost each and every
connection with ascribed roles and started to operate using the
government-opposition code, which is the simplest way to "futurize" and
legitimize its structures. 14 In that sense, republicanism represented a
concept of movement, which did for political action what "progress"
promised to do for the whole of history. Koselleck ultimately
demonstrated that
[t]he old concept of 'republic,' which had previously
indicated a condition, became a telos, and was at the
same time rendered into a concept of movement by
means of the suffix 'ism.' It served the purpose of
theoretically anticipating future historical movement
and practically influencing it. The temporal difference
between all previously experienced forms of rule and the
constitution that was to be expected and toward which
one should strive was in this way embodied in a concept
that had a direct influence on political life.15
12. See, e.g., JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF
DIVERSITY (1995); SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION: CONTINUITY AND INNOVATION
IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1960); SHELDON S. WOLIN, THE PRESENCE OF THE PAST:
ESSAYS ON THE STATE AND THE CONSTITUTION (1990); Richard S. Kay, Constitutional
Chrononomy, 13 RATIO JURIS 31 (2000). For the framing of modern constitutionalism into
the "struggle" between facts and norms, facticity and ideality, see generally S.N.
EISENSTADT, THE GREAT REVOLUTIONS AND THE CIVILIZATIONS OF MODERNITY (2006).
13. KOSELLECK, supra note 3, at 274.
14. See Niklas Luhmann, Verfassung als evolutiondre Errungenschaft [Constitution as
an Evolutionary Accomplishment], 9 RECHTSHISTORICHES JOURNAL [LEGAL HISTORY
JOURNAL] 176 (1990) (Ger.).
15. KOSELLECK, supra note 3, at 273 (emphasis added).
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Modern constitutions were embedded into a new and progressive
temporal semantic, where the past represented only ancient times
needing to be overcome, the present represented the time where
constituent powers might have disclosed their revolutionary thrust, and
the future represented the ideal image of a new society.16 That is why
from the early days of modern constitutionalism, the problem of
stability/change was so strongly debated.17
Are contemporary generations entitled to frame the future of the
next ones? What kind of procedures must the constituent powers adopt
in order to change what is "unchangeable" at one stroke? Is it rational to
constrain and freeze the future of a nation? After the Second World
War, constitutionalism seemed to colonize the whole sociopolitical scape,
and these questions disappeared from the debate.18 The new problem
became how to export and establish the culture of constitutionalism
everywhere (even where the structural and cultural prerequisites of
constitutions were fully absent)-even if this took a lot of time.19
Especially in politically and socially fractured nation-states, the future
of the constitution was discounted to find ways to reconstruct (or invent)
a common and viable past so as to reframe a livable present. 20 The
16. MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003); BILL KISSANE, NEW
BEGINNINGS: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN MODERN IRELAND (2011). The
literature about constitutions as a "new beginning" is well developed, especially
concerning constitution building processes in Africa.
17. See generally STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1995) (describing the early debates on temporal limits of
constitutions); MICHAEL LIENESCH, NEW ORDER OF THE AGES: TIME, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1988) (describing the
introduction of a new cultural timeframe in the U.S. Constitution); ROBERT JUSTIN LIPKIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS: PRAGMATISM AND THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2000) (describing the role of constitutional courts); M.J.C.
VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2d ed. 1998) (describing the
separation of powers).
18. See generally Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
771 (1997).
19. Probably the most influential scholar (in the debate about global
constitutionalism), who denies the problem of time is Jilrgen Habermas. It seems to me
that, for him, actors and institutions always have all the time needed to find the most
reasonable and universal solution. In his theory time appears only as a "present" which is
taken for granted (for example "taking for granted" that the relevant constitutional
principles and moral norms are presumptively accepted in the process of constitution
making) and as a "future" that is an ideal projection of the citizenry's (well-informed and
formed) will. See JORGEN HABERMAS, THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN UNION: A RESPONSE
(Ciaran Cronin trans., 2012).
20. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: How LINCOLN
REDEFINED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001).
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future was frozen inside nation-states, taking for granted a
state-divided world.21
But after a very short period of time-roughly from the 1950s to the
1970s-what was called "globalization" entered the sociopolitical scene
and messed up this "stable" sociopolitical configuration. 22 From the
beginning, globalization showed elective affinities with the so-called
social-acceleration and with what Luhmann called the "temporalization
of complexity." 23 Temporalization changed everything because "[t]he
definitions in relation to persons and to space were in many respects
replaced by definitions in relation to time."24 The problems became not
how to "project" an ideal future to orient the present on the basis of a
sound and secure past, but how to live in the present without the help of
any stable tradition and with the "possibility" of an open and
progressive future and, above all, how to project in the future a
normative ideal if we are not sure that tomorrow it will be useful and
socially acceptable. 25
On the basis of this theoretical background, I would like to show
that changing the form of observation from a spatial to a temporal
framework may help in understanding the future of constitutionalism in
a different and creative way. To cite but a few of many examples, such
shifts could help us to reconsider: (a) the reason so many scholars now
prefer to talk about "processes" of constitutionalization instead of
constitutions as "structures" (the preference for dynamic instead of
static analysis); (b) the growing relevance of courts instead of legislative
bodies for processes of global constitutionalization (the preference for
short-term decision-making instead of long-term decision-making); (c)
the blurring or vanishing of the modern distinction between pouvoir
constituant/pouvoir constitud (the preference for the fictitious
self-constitution of a "we" before it is actually constituted); (d) the
fundamental role of human rights and dignity within the processes of
global constitutionalization (the preference for value commitments that
do not end in a definitive list of rights); (e) the unexpected and growing
function of delayed decision-making as a methodology for maintaining
21. See, e.g., Dieter Grimm, Integration by Constitution, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 193 (2005)
(recounting numerous examples of constitutions failing and succeeding because of
underlying norms and conditions in the ratifying society).
22. See generally THOMAS HYLLAND ERIKSEN, TYRANNY OF THE MOMENT: FAST AND
SLOW TIME IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2011).
23. See generally NIKIAS LUHMANN, GESELLScHAFTSSTRUKTUR UND SEMANTIK: STUDIEN
ZUR WISSENSSOZIOLOGIE DER MODERNEN GESELLSCHAFr. BAND 2 (1993).
24. NIKLAs LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 268-69 (Fatima Kastner et al. eds.,
Klaus A. Ziegert trans., 2d ed. 2009).
25. See Niklas Luhmann, Are There Still Indispensable Norms in Our Society?, 14
SOZIALE SYSTEME 18, 26 (2008).
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an open future in legal proceedings (the preference for freezing
decision-making instead of deciding without knowing the consequences
of decisions); and (f) the possible auto-subversion of constitutions
through an "extra legal" normative radical subculture (the choice to exit
the legal system to serve humanity or other extra-legal values). In my
opinion all of these problems have to do with the so-called
"temporalization of complexity." Ultimately, introducing temporal
analysis into the theory of constitutionalism means dealing with one of
the most astonishing possible catastrophes of our social world: social
"variety" (the number of possible social operations and their complexity)
exceeded the possibilities of stabilization so that evolution could collapse
in a self-deconstruction of social subsystems. 26 In particular, all the
arrangements for the stabilization of law-constitutions
included-become themselves dynamic and rapidly head toward the
variation of law. As Luhmann anticipated, the mechanism for the
variation of law becomes circularly supercharged with self-produced
conflicts in which the norm stipulates how the conflict is going to be
resolved. Legal change becomes normal, and the average period of
normative validity decreases, coming closer to a self-contradictory
minimum length. This process leads to the loss of the legitimacy and
reliability of law in the face of all of the other social subsystems and
society as a whole.
Constitutions will remain necessary, but more improbable.
Reactions against the culture of constitutionalism are emerging
worldwide such as new totalitarian empires (China?), widespread
political corruption (the buying and selling of votes, lobbying, economic
pressures on the political elites), economization without legal restraint
(globalization of mafias), the indifference of global political elites toward
the social conditions of excluded people (African and Russian
unconstitutional politics), and totalitarianism of the mass media. These
phenomena unleash in society new powers and new possible dangers.
New opportunities for corruption, subjugation, alienation, and
undemocratic political control could emerge without the possibility of a
counteracting force with the help of law. The worst landscape is one
where the new powers-not only political ones-may operate without
any legal control. Of course, one can count on the globalized mass media
system always being interested in delivering the "latest news" about
scandals and human rights violations, thereby confirming and
26. This means the definitive collapse of the optimistic and progressive evolutionary
social thought which reached its peak with the teleonomic theory of Talcott Parsons. See
generally UTA GERHARDT, THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF TALCOTr PARSONS: METHODOLOGY
AND AMERICAN ETHOS (2011). See also NIKLAS LUHMANN, DIE GESELLSCHAFT DER
GESELLScHAFr [THE SOCIETY OF SOCIETY] (1998) (Ger.) (reciting Parson's theory).
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condensing the basic layers of the global legal system. However, no one
really knows whether the billions of psychic systems disseminated
around the globe will be interested in focusing their attention on such
scandals, or if they will be too busy and exhausted by the claims of daily
life.
On the other hand, one could dream about a global constitution
capable of enforcing the law everywhere. For sure, what we are actually
seeing is the widespread use of "symbolic law" to cover up the actions of
the powers that be. 27 The hope (or illusion) that power could be
constituted as a legal order is still present. But if we generalize the idea
of power from politics, and re-embed it into new functionally
differentiated global spheres, it becomes easy to ask if "the current
prominence of the legal system and the dependence of society itself and
of most of its functional systems on a functioning legal coding are
nothing but a European anomaly, which might well level off with the
evolution of global society."28
At the end of the day, it seems that the modern asymmetric
relationship between the space of experience and the horizon of
expectations is turning upside down. If we conceive the so-called
post-modernity as the increasingly "rapid" growth of contingencies
(different possible experiences), a new relation comes into being: the
thicker the experiences are (positive or not), the more cautious one
becomes (because one has to decide cautiously), but also the more open
the future (that cannot begin). If this was the case, and for us this
means a huge deflation of constitutional values, then "the end of Neuzeit
as optimizing progress would have arrived."29 There will be too many
possibilities to manage for a future that never begins because it passes
immediately in a past future, or it flies away in a next future. Politics
can only react to contingencies and does not have the time to project and
organize a "better society" 30- tempus fugit, reality becomes virtuality,
27. E.g., MARCELO NEVES, SYMBOLISCHE KONSTITUTIONALISIERUNG [SYMBOLIC
CONSTITUTIONALISM] (1988) (Ger.) (discussing the symbolic function of the texts of
constitutions, which feature a lack of legal normative substantiation).
28. The question was asked, obviously, by Niklas Luhmann. LUHMANN, supra note 24,
at 490.
29. KOSELLECK, supra note 3, at 274.
30. This is the distopic scenario imagined by Emilios Christodoulidis just in this Issue.
It is worth noting that Christodoulidis bases his argumentation exactly on the different
temporal capacity of political systems (national-states) and economic systems-at the
global level-to "irritate" constitutionalism. Economic systems operate in a faster way
than political systems. That's why constitutionalisation could be dangerously reduced to a
"market capture" without any real connection with democracy. See also Emilios
Christodoulidis, Of Boundaries and 'Tipping Points'" A Response to Gunther Teubner, 20
Soc. & L. STUD. 238 (2011).
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and the ideal vanishes into the management of a never-ending present.
In a nutshell, if modern constitutions could be interpreted as the
present future addressed toward the Utopian ideal of "good society,"
present-day constitutions would tend to defuturize themselves as
future-presents and become a legal-political technology of sorts, aimed
at steering a temporalized social complexity. This is the only future that
may begin.
II. ESCAPING THE METAPHOROLOGY OF SPACE: ENTERING TEMPORAL
ANALYSIS
The very idea of modern constitutionalism and its legacy is
undeniably linked to the emerging features of nation-states. A
constitution is a body of metanorms (or the highest-order legal norms
and principles) produced by a self-reflective "we" (a well-defined polity)
through a political decision that establishes and regulates the exercise
of political power and gives a collective and future orientation to the
polity.3 1 Only after a long period of "latency," hindered by so-called
methodological nationalism, was the idea that constitutions might cross
national and international boundaries accepted as a topic of scientific
debate. 32 The single most important phenomenon, which eased the
decoupling between constitutions and nation-states, was so-called
globalization. The huge explosion of papers and reflections certifies
globalization's entry into the scientific and political debate. Nowadays it
is almost impossible to add something new without case studies and
commentaries.
Globalization introduced at least two innovative phenomena: (1)
new and unexpected couplings between law and global, functionally
differentiated social spheres (the so-called juridification of social
spheres); and (2) the acceleration of time and the emergence of a
desynchronized, high-speed society. The new coupling between law and
social spheres has been debated worldwide: first through the label of
"regulated self-regulations" of different social spheres and then through
the concept of "societal or civil constitutionalism." 33 But even when the
31. See generally Hans Lindahl, Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an
Ontology of Collective Selfhood, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 9 (Martin
Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007) (looking at how collective identity is shaped by
political community).
32. See generally CHRIS THORNHILL, A SOCIOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONS: CONSTITUTIONS
AND STATE LEGITIMACY IN HISTORICAL-SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (2011) (exploring the
reasons why modern societies require constitutions and presenting socio-normative
analysis of the constitutional preconditions of political legitimacy).
33. The theory of societal constitutionalism is admirably developed by GUNTHER TEUBNER,
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION (2012).
739
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
issue of constitutionalism had almost exceeded the modern boundaries
of the state, the whole debate remained directed, and strongly
influenced, by a powerful "metaphorology" of space. 34
Let us look at the work of Gunther Teubner as an exemplary
paradigm. From the very beginning, he created a theory oriented by a
moral "hidden agenda": to tame the possible uncork of powers, to
enchain the Beast(s)! Not only the Leviathan (state power), but all the
other emerging "snakes" too.35 In Teubner's works, the double function
of constitution-constitutive and limitative-deals well with the
metaphorology of space. First, someone (the constituent power) has to
"constitute" something by drawing a distinction: "this" and "not that"!
Then, the constituted power has to be limited, drawing another
distinction (legal/illegal), and metacoded by the
constitutional-unconstitutional distinction. In other words, first you
create an inner space, distinguishing it from the outside; then you
reenter the distinction (system/environment) so as to regulate it from
within.36  The very idea of "drawing a distinction"-the first
commandment of system theory, the incipit of the world-uses a spatial
metaphor, a slash (/).37
Dirk Baecker, for instance, analyzed the problem of power as the
reembedding (reentry) of acts of arbitrariness into the frame of
arbitration and then developed his theory of forms of arbitration as a
sequence going through Nomos (tribal society), privilege (ancient
society), reason (modern society), and finally toward the frame that he
defines as "regime."38 Hans Lindhal is working out this sort of theory
34. I use the concept of "metaphorology" in the way it is elaborated by HANS
BLUMENBERG, PARADIGMS FOR A METAPHOROLOGY (2010) (arguing for the existence of
absolute metaphors that cannot be translated back into conceptual language and which
answers the theoretically unanswerable questions whose relevance lies quite simply in the
fact that we find them already posed in the ground of our existence).
35. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, A Constitutional Moment? The Logics of 'Hitting the
Bottom', in THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE DARK SIDE OF
FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION 1 (Poul F. Kjaer et al. eds., 2011) (discussing the social
effects of the aggressive growth during the financial crisis); Gunther Teubner, Fragmented
Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism Beyond the Nation State, in THE TWILIGHT OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM?, supra note 1, at 327 (describing how constitutionalism should react
to an increase in private governance in the transnational sphere).
36. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMS THEORY (2012).
37. The Laws of Form were elaborated in 1969 by George Spencer Brown and then
developed by Niklas Luhmann in his sociological theory. See generally NIKLAS LUHMANN,
THEORIES OF DISTINCTION: REDESCRIBING THE DESCRIPTIONS OF MODERNITY 99 (William
Rasch ed., 2002).
38. Dirk Baecker, The Power to Rule the World, in SOZIOLOGISCHE JURISPRUDENZ:
FEsTSCHRIFr FOR GUNTHER TEUBNER ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG [SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE.
COMMEMORATIVE PUBLICATION FOR GUNTHER TEUBNER'S 65TH BIRTHDAY] 673 (Gralf-Peter
Calliess et al. eds., 2009) (Ger.).
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too: each system (he calls it a "collective," but I call it a "societal
subjectivity") includes and excludes its "Other" through its boundaries,
and every legal system is recognizable because of its way of building up
"ought to do" expectations. This self-constituted legal space (with an
inside and an outside) is embedded into another space, a-legality, which
is surrounded by an "imaginary space," a Chora (unmarked space),
which allows the systems to find their place in the world (i.e. what is not
observable as a whole). 39 And it is precisely here that we can better
understand the metaphor of constitution as a "container,"-the idea
that law must enchain public powers. 40
The same spatial metaphors influence the debate about global
constitutions, where the goal is to detach constitutions from the spatial
boundaries of nation-states. From this point of view, societal
constitutionalism is a way to civilize global society or, as Moritz Renner
wrote, to "occupy the system(s)." 41 The debate tries to apply the
"metaphorology" of space in every possible direction, with the basic
problem being the crossing of national borders (by different kinds of law:
administrative, private, contractual) and the development of plural legal
spheres (lex mercatoria, digital, sports, and artistic).42 This represents
the invisible frame of all debates. The shadow of the modern
self-description of politics (and law) is too strong to be evaded at one
stroke: Rechtstaat (the legal state) and then the constitutional state-
two semantics indicating the (imaginary) unity of the legal and political
national system-are still mastering and limiting our "sociological
imagination."43
Within this powerful spatial frame of reference, however, we risk
losing the second condition of possibility for defining something: its
identifiability in time! This is the sociological legacy of Talcott
Parsons:44 if you want to observe something, you have to indicate it (and
differentiate it from something else) and localize it in both dimensions of
39. See generally Hans Lindahl, A-Legality: Postnationalism and the Question of Legal
Boundaries, 73 MOD. L. REV. 30 (2010) (describing how postnationalism affects a-legality).
40. For the concept of constitutions as containers, see Ulrich K. Preuss, Disconnecting
Constitutions from Statehood: Is Global Constitutionalism a Viable Concept?, in THE
TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM?, supra note 1, at 23.
41. See Moritz Renner, Occupy the System! Societal Constitutionalism and
Transnational Corporate Accounting, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 941 (2013).
42. See generally, PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE
OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012).
43. E.g., DIETER GRIMM, DIE ZUKuNF' DER VERFASSUNG [THE FUTURE OF THE
CONSTITUTION] (3d ed. 2002) (Ger.) (discussing how constitutions seem to be losing their
validity and how a reformed understanding of constitutions might be able to prevent this
development).
44. See generally TALCOTT PARSONS, SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND THE EVOLUTION OF ACTION
THEORY (1977).
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space and time. In other words, you have to identify a system (in an
environment). To identify a system is to draw a line in space and time.
It is to recall a distinction and to confirm it in time. You need to draw a
distinction, but "then" you need to confirm and recall it in the next
moment if you want to stress the identity. This is it until further notice,
but if you want to change identity you have to take time to cross the
previous distinction and pass to the other side! And the process takes
time, as every creation does! Constitutions themselves are created as
temporalized structures. The famous temporal paradox underlining the
distinction between constituent and constituted power (preceded by the
equivalent paradox of the social contract, so clearly evident in Hobbes'
Leviathan), the phantasmatic presence of the People "before" the people,
the problems concerning the arbitrariness of using powers and creating
law, and the possibility of amending the not amendable are all features
relating to the temporal dimension of constitutions. 45 Framing the
constitution within a temporal dimension means to conceive it as a
structural (durable) coupling between politics and law that emerged (at
a certain time) to bind social time and to stabilize normative expectation
between the two subsystems.
The double function of a constitution is to legalize political power (to
limit and enable its utilization in a certain way) and to legitimate the
production of law (to evade the problem of arbitrariness).46 These two
functions bind the "future in the present" with the "present in the
future" of a society. For example, anyone can expect that the legislator
will decide to enact a statute within a specific legal procedure and in
line with constitutional values. If not, the statute will be judged as
invalid. The present future of the statute is represented by the will of
the parliament formed through, and only by means of, a special
proceeding. It is intended to give a certain form to the future of the
collectivity: the future present is represented by the normative valid
projections enforced by the statute from the moment of its enactment
until the day it ceases to be valid. At the same time, everyone can expect
that all legal communication will be considered by everyone else as valid
law (until further notice). In this sense, a constitution is an effective
device to stop the logical regressus ad infinitum, which characterizes the
45. E.g., ERNsT-WOLFGANG BOcKENFORDE, STAAT, VERFASSUNG, DEMOKRATIE: STUDIEN
zU VERFASSUNGSTHEORIE UND ZUM VERFASSUNGSRECHT [STATE, CONSTITUTION, DEMOCRACY:
STUDIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND LAw] (1991) (Ger.); JAMIN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING
DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (2003); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A
CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING DOcUMENT DOESN'T MEAN WHAT IT
MEANT BEFORE (2009); Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituents Assemblies, 2
J. CONST. L. 345 (2000).
46. See generally Luhmann, supra note 14; TEUBNER, supra note 33.
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foundations of valid law and the legitimacy of political power.47 It is
worth noting that regressus is a problem of time: you do not have
enough time to follow the stream until the end.
From a temporal point of view, a constitution is a legal and political
device geared toward stabilizing normative expectations, especially with
the use of so-called constitutive rules: rules (expectations) about how to
rule. The temporal dimension of constitutions is relevant not only
because they play the role of a stop-rule concerning the foundation of
law (what or who legitimates the constitution: God, the People, law
itself, stakeholders, the spirit of the time, nothing), but "above all"
(another spatial metaphor) because the function of law (and of
constitution as "basic law") is to bind time and not, as many theories
say, to integrate society.
A second way to introduce time horizons in our reflections is to try
to understand the impact of the so-called temporalization of law on the
very idea and practice of constitutions and constitutionalism.48 From
this point of view, I want to underline the contradictions between the
constitution as basic law-the law that cannot be changed or that can be
changed only through very special and "slow" proceedings-and the
"hurry" resulting from the need to change the law in the face of
environmental irritations. 49 My suggestion is that focusing on time
might help us in our thinking about the future of constitutions, in the
sense of which (cognitive and normative) expectancies we could have
regarding their developments up to this decisive question: In the age of
the temporalization of law, could constitutions continue to function as a
special kind of "immune system" of society, or could we expect the
emergence/emergency of a sort of a global immune-deficiency?5 0 Will
societal constitutions continue to operate on the basis of their
constitutional codes (rules for conflicts capable of regulating the
collisions between the differentiated organization of "collective" powers
and between those powers and their environments) and react against
the environmental irritations, or will the nontractable hyper velocity of
47. See, e.g., GIoRIlo AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., 2005); Jacques
Derrida, Force de loi- Le 'rondement mystique de l'autoritd" [Force of Law: The "Mystical
Foundation ofAuthority'l, 11 CARDOzO L. REV. 920 (1990).
48. I found similar insights in Neil Walker, Out of Place and Out of Time: Law's
Fading Co-ordinates, 14 EDINBURGH L. REV. 13 (2010), but he still insists on a metaphor
of space: "uncharted" law. See also DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
49. This was the traditional idea of the Constitutions as the basic Law. Recall that
Locke argued that the fundamental Constitutions of Carolina should remain the sacred
and unalterable form and rule of government forever. This preference for an unchanging
body of constitutional law long exerted a strong influence on the mainstream of liberal
democratic constitutionalism and a clear veto to amendment procedures.
50. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 475-77.
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changing rules and laws transform the basic law itself into a danger for
the social system? Will constitutions react against themselves,
unleashing self-destructive immune-deficiency syndrome across society?
To cite one example: will the European Union avoid constitutionalizing
itself in a better way (or at all) because of the huge irritations coming
from the economic systems? Will the idea of constitutionalizing the
balanced-budget be a viable one? And further, given the necessity of
changing laws as soon as possible, will constitutions transform
themselves into empty boxes for value commitments-that is pure
symbolic politics for a Utopian present future so abstract as to serve
nothing? These are only some of the questions an observer could ask,
but only if he is able to shift the focus of his attention from the spatial
analysis of constitutions to their temporal analysis.
III. TIME IS ON MY SIDE (AND RIGHTS TOO!): THE TIME-BINDING
FUNCTION OF LAW
In order to focus on the topic in this section, we need to start afresh
by reflecting on the basic function of law. Sociologists usually start by
affirming that the function of law is to "integrate" society or to solve (to
"hide" or "conceal," in the critical version) its conflicts.51 Crucial as they
may be, however, these functions do not represent the function that law
operates for society as a whole. It is worth noting that according to these
theories, constitutions are devices conceived as basic higher laws needed
to integrate-symbolically or instrumentally-a national society. 52 From
this point of view, a constitution tends to become a sort of symbolic "ID"
of a nation, and its legal relevance practically vanishes. Constitutional
actors are so petrified that the constitution's present future is expected
to control and reproduce its future presents that it operates as a
negative feedback device addressed to maintain the identity of the
system (morphostasis).5 3 The right value is "latent pattern
maintenance," and amendments are introduced only when very special
reasons can be found to do so. At the same time, the idea that
constitutions could exceed national borders is a "taboo" because this is
51. See, as the champion of this idea and deriving from the work of Emile Durkheim
and Talcott Parsons, JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (1996).
52. See generally GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES:
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (1985); JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1998); Dieter
Grimm, The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization, 12 CONSTELLATIONS 447
(2005); Neil Walker, Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global
Disorder of Normative Orders, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 373 (2008).
53. See WALTER BUCKLEY, SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SYSTEM THEORY (1967).
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immediately perceived as a "violation" of identity or dissolution of the
political "body."
We need to change this analytical frame to go a step further, and in
doing so we can count on Niklas Luhmann's analysis. Luhmann
conceives law as a social "language" performing the function of
maintaining (stabilizing) normative expectations in the face of (ongoing)
disappointments: law binds time (Zeitbindung).5 4 The functions of law
are not represented by its social performance. For example, in
regulating human behavior or resolving dispute, society has developed
many functional equivalents to accomplish these functions. Law deals
with communicating expectations so as to make sure they are accepted
in further communications. Therefore, law fails to carry out its function
only when the expectations it communicates cease to be normative. If
people look at you as a fool when you claim your right not to be beaten
up by a policeman, then law is not in action (or there is a emergency
power in action). Expectations are the fabric of society. Nobody can do
anything without this enduring time horizon. Expectations are
condensed and confirmed in social structures that normally are coupled
with consciences.55 Without social expectations it is impossible to solve
the problem of double contingency: in other words, it is impossible to
have a society, but only incoherent events.56
Normative expectations link the present (the only time at our
disposal) with projections of the future, which are expectations as to
what will be socially approved in the future. The problem is pervasive
and inescapable: everything happens only in the present! Systems do
whatever they do for the first and the last time, as an event, all the
time. Events have no duration and cannot be changed, only memorized
or forgotten. Systems exist only at the point in time in which they
operate: they are forced to assume an uncontrollable world that exists
simultaneously at that point of time. The only way to extend time (that
is, to "gain" time for operating with ease) is to fix the "present" as a
distinction between "past" and "future." This fix allows systems to
distinguish themselves through their own operations linking their
present situation with past and future situations.5 7 Only in the present
can systems consider the past as something that cannot be changed and
54. See LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 142-72.
55. This is not a fact to be taken for granted.
56. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS 103-36 (John Bednarz, Jr. trans., 1995)
(explaining the fundamental relevance of the solution to "double contingency" for generating
social systems).
57. See generally ELENA ESPOSITO, THE FUTURE OF FUTURES: THE TIME OF MONEY IN
FINANCING AND SOCIETY (2011) (introducing the systemic theory of time, especially in
connection with economics).
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the future as something that can be changed. Only with an open future
can systems project, make selections, control their internal states, and
try to influence the surrounding environment. Only within time can a
system decide, and decisions are special ways of dealing with time,
reducing the oppressive uncertainty of the future.5 8
Every decision exerts its influence on future presents, i.e. on the
conditions of possibility of the system itself. That is the reason why
every decision should evaluate its consequences for the future and
develop some kind of (presumed) rationality. 59 On this "ephemeral"
basis nothing can easily be connected with anything else. To endure,
systems need to create temporal structures: expectations of expectations
(reflective expectations). This creation explains the system's
self-referentiality in regard to its temporal dimension: it construes its
present as the past of its future present, that is, as a condensed rule for
future decisions. A system has to connect its "futures in the present"
(what it can expect now for its future) with the "presents in the future"
(what the system cannot control) in a meaningful way. The peculiarity
of law is not only to be a temporal structure, but also to make it possible
to know which expectations will meet with social approval and which
will not. Luhmann calls these kinds of expectancies "normative" to
distinguish them from "cognitive" expectations.60 When normative
expectations are coded using the legal-illegal dichotomy, society begins
to build a legal subsystem and distinguish it from its environment. The
closure of the legal system is needed to reduce complexity and is based
on a fictive self-representation that gives unity to a difference (between
law and not law).6 1
To stabilize a subsystem of law, some internal and external
conditions need to be met. Internally, it is necessary to develop
organizations capable of deciding what the law is; externally, it is
necessary to manage, politically and ethically, dissent and conflicts
between law and its environment. For my purposes, it is necessary only
to introduce the "sancta sanctorum"of the system of law: legal validity.
Validity is the symbol for the connection of legal communications, its
internal "connecting value."62 From this point of view, validity is
duration, the possibility to maintain and to secure ongoing legal
58. See generally, HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY, VOL. 1, 2, 3
(1984/1987); JAMES C. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1993).
59. See generally NIKLAs LUHMANN, ORGANISATION UND ENTSCHEIDUNG [ORGANIZATION
AND DECISION] (2000) (Ger.) (demonstrating the internal and logical connection between
organization, time, risk, and decision).
60. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 357-80.
61. See generally GUNTHER TEUBNER, AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH To LAW
AND SOCIETY (1987).
62. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 122.
746
THE FUTURE OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
communication. In the "meantime," nothing changes, and everyone can
continue to operate without fearing about the next moment. Validity is
the "symbol for the dynamic stability of the system, which is expressed
in backward and forward references to the past and the future."63
Without this entangled structuring of time, society cannot elaborate
law. Law can exist as a system of communication only if its symbol can
be circulated, expected, and recognized in society.
It is time to go a step further. The system of law is a closed system
because everything that counts within it is mediated by its code
(legallillegal).64 At the same time, it is an open system continuously
irritated by its environment. And the modality of irritation depends on
the form of societal differentiation that influences the degree of social
complexity. This means that the relationship between the subsystem of
law and society can change (and indeed does). It is precisely this
relationship that makes the future of constitutions more challenging. In
the modern world, the awareness of complexity and the acceleration of
structural changes in nearly all social domains arise and rule out the
claim that the problems of the world can be worked out logically or
theoretically.6 5 Nobody has the time or the knowledge to work out all of
the problems of the world in that manner. This is the paradoxical, risky
situation of the so-called knowledge society: the more you lack the
knowledge needed to solve problems, the more you have to decide so you
can reduce uncertainties.
Society shifts from a generalized "normative" style to a cognitive
style to deal with uncertainties. 66 If you are disappointed, you must
learn that you lack support from other people in maintaining your
expectations: you become simple-minded, a traditionalist, or someone
embedded in cultural relics. On the contrary, you can act resolutely if
the law is on your side. The paradox, however, is that now legality is
under siege too:
Against better knowledge, it must be pretended that
there was something which is reliable, or which-at
least-justified a certain course of action. . . . For, if the
pressure for action cuts the search for knowledge short,
no guarantee can be demanded for the enduring validity
63. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 129.
64. For the systemic theory of law, see GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC
SYSTEM (1993).
65. See generally NIKLAS LUHMANN, OBSERVATIONS ON MODERNITY (1998).
66. See generally NIco STEHR, KNOWLEDGE SOCIETIES (1994); HELMUT WILLKE, SMART
GOVERNANCE: GOVERNING THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (2007).
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of a decision, and options must be kept open for new
doubts, better insights, and a change in the rules.6 7
Of course, there are many functional equivalents for certainty:
religious fundamentalism, economic provisions, political ideologies, the
mass media's illusion of control, and scientific publications. These
structures, however, do not produce normative expectations, that is,
something that is normatively expected by others too.
What happens when global society starts to accelerate and prefer
cognitive expectations, that is, to sensitize expectations to learning?
Simply, that the old idea of society as a cybernetic machine-and that of
the legal system as the inner regulatory mechanism serving the
adaptation of society to its environment--comes crashing down.68
Within globalization and high-speed society, the function of law seems
to be declining and vanishing. The evolution of society leads to the
morphogenesis of systems and toward the normalization of
improbabilities.69 Above all, this means that the symbols of legal
validity, and among them the constitution as the basic law, begin to
dissociate from any original beginning and from any external
reference. 70 Law is law (and nothing else), and it must change. New
laws replace old ones, and even sharp temporal inconsistencies should
not be seen as unjust per se. Law is valid only until further notice.
Temporalization is increased when legal norms come equipped with
assumptions about the ever-changing reality. This is when the legal
system begins to reincorporate environmental reality into itself. Norms
are cognitively sensitized, equipped with "assumptions of reality," and,
of course, considered to be errors in the legal system. 71 The legal system
might be pushed to a final paradox: taking for granted the "facticity" of
law as it is found because of the huge effort to reform it. In the end, we
could find the reintroduction of arbitrariness into the legal system,
which is a sort of law without any motivational force. A law is capable of
linking legal communications only for a while and without any social
legitimacy. This kind of inclusion is very risky: the legal system starts
to produce risks from within and needs to limit itself in front of
intractable complexity.
In summary, in the age of the acceleration of time and of
temporalization of social complexity: (1) every temporal extension of
67. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 286.
68. For this distopic landscape, see id. at 469.
69. See generally WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL
ACCELERATION OF TIME (2004).
70. See TEUBNER, supra note 61.
71. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 464-90.
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expectations puts a burden on those who will suffer if their future
becomes restrained, that is, those who have to obey the law without
being included in the procedure of its creation; (2) legal validity, the
invariable and secure point of departure for the circulation of legal
communication, begins to change and means that what is deemed valid
is valid until it is changed (and nobody knows when this will happen);
and (3) the estimation of consequences as a principle for decision-
making pushes the validity of law into the future. However, nobody has
the information needed to decide, and nobody knows what will happen
after the decision is made. The present future of law is irreparably
disjointed with regard to its future presents. The future of law is
squeezed between Utopian and normative ideals of law and a mere
technology of lawmaking. The futurization and defuturization of law
and the inflation and deflation of law are simultaneously "present."72
The horizon of law, expected to link sky (values, ideals, and visions) and
earth (facts, realities, and realism), is not approachable.
IV. LAW IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL ACCELERATION: FROM SECURITY AND
STABILITY TO RISKS AND FLEXIBILITY, FROM INTERPRETATION TO
CREATIVITY, FROM PARLIAMENTARY LEGISLATION TO COURTS AND
GOVERNMENTS
We can observe the consequences of high-speed society on law from
many different points of view. In a nutshell, the debate identifies a new
dramatic dilemma: accelerating lawmaking and risking the loss of
democratic procedures (legality) or maintaining long and slow
democratic procedures and losing the capacity to make law
(legitimacy).73 New clashes among the values of change versus
permanence, adaptation versus tradition, flexibility versus permanence,
and frozen constitutions versus living constitutions arise. I will discuss
four crucial problems.
A. From Legal Security, Stability, and Clarity to Risk, Flexibility, and
Opaqueness
We have seen -that global society is increasingly sensitized by
cognitive styles. In the design of both system theory and society, the
principle of risk (and correspondingly of new dangers) replaces the
72. For the concepts of futurization and defuturization, see Luhmann, supra note 9, at
141.
73. See SCHEUERMAN, supra note 69.
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principle of adaptation. 74 This means that decisions are expected
anytime and everywhere because they are the ultimate mechanism for
absorbing uncertainties. If you cannot foresee the future presents, it is
better to decide immediately, hoping that your decision changes the
situation. And if you choose, you take a risk. The result is that only
society can destroy itself with its decisions (or deciding not to decide); it
has to be responsible for its solutions. Society starts to experience an
uncomfortable sense of instability. But exactly for the same reason,
normative expectations and their stabilization retain and increase their
importance. Law remains concerned with the contra-factual
stabilization of the future's projections. But, as Luhmann affirms,
there is an intensification of the problem that can be
defined as the distinction between the present's future
and the future's present. Law cannot be stable over time
in the sense that what is valid once is valid forever. If
one wants to rely on law, one can count on support
against resistance and disappointments but one cannot
expect that the law will not change.7 5
Therefore, law has to pay attention to law's own risk. And it must do
it mainly without the help of politics.
With law, society must secure its future in the present, but cannot
say anything about its presents in the future since law must make do
without a certain future. Securing the present through legislation, for
instance, means to supply society with relatively unchanging and stable
norms that possess a reasonable chance to endure for a lengthy period of
time. Stable norms allow individuals to plan and coordinate their
activity and ensure that societal actors operate in a predictable legal
environment. In a seminal work, William E. Scheuerman demonstrated
that "like rational maps and clocks, the modern rule of law implicitly
rested on the aspiration to render both time and place rationally
manageable."76 In modern law, every rule builds on predictions about
the future drawn from past and present experiences. Forcing the future
into the law was not problematic because traditional forms of
rulemaking and adjudication rested on a marked orientation to the past.
With globalization, this traditional alliance between the rule of law
(based on a system of clear, general, stable, prospective, public, and
74. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 472.
75. Id. at 471.
76. SCHEUERMAN, supra note 69, at 158.
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private norms) and societal processes, a Weberian and "modernistic"
topic for sure, collapses.
According to Scheuerman, globalization flourishes where such legal
culture declines. Because of its preference for porous, open-ended, and
soft law, computerized currency trading and its hypervelocity, which is
not manageable by normal human beings, is a good example of the
vanishing of the liberal rule of law model. Not even the modern
codification of commercial law is useful for high-speed society. For
instance, in litigation proceedings, the new value is not in assigning
guilt to one party in reference to a past act, but the value is in a quick
compromise or agreement emphasizing positive lessons to be learned for
the sake of maintaining cordial ties in the future.7 7 What is remarkable,
here, is the temporalization of the validity of law, since continuity with
the past may appear to be an impediment to successful economic action.
Scheuerman sums up these argumentations with a sharp statement:
Traditional forms of lawmaking are rapidly rendered
out-of-date given the dynamic character of social and
economic change, and the half-life of formal and even
more flexible 'substantive' legal norms appears to be
experiencing a dramatic decline: in the age of speed 'law
will be easily trapped in the dilemma: either to remain
static and be ignored, or to keep up with social dynamics
and to be devalued as a normative reference.'78
B. From the Enactment of Law Toward Creativity and the Tyranny of
Presumptive Consequences
The acceleration of society leads to another basic change in the very
foundation of law. The dilemma here is between deciding to weigh the
consequences of decisions without being obliged to implement the law in
any case or guaranteeing long procedures and proceedings so that the
decisions can be delayed. The legal system turns to the prognosis of
consequences and the justification of decisions by reference to their
consequences, without being able to doctrinally deal with the problems
that arise. In other words, "doctrinal resources are depleted and
replaced with the flexible, if not empty, paradigm of the weighing up of
interests or balancing of values."79 This new legal culture
simultaneously enables and constrains the system of law. This legal
77. See LUHMANN, supra note 65.
78. Id. at 213-14.
79. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 455.
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culture enables the system to self-reproduce through decision-making,
while also constraining the system because
[tihe seemingly firm order of legal propositions (and its
traditional form of consistency-test) is guided by fluid,
provisional decision-making on the basis of an
appreciation of values, and thus by unstable guides for
the relatively stable system. This means, using the
terminology introduced above, that the variety of the
system increases and that the maintenance of
redundancy becomes a problem.80
This new legal culture results in what we can call the normal chaos
of law (not of love!), and it is especially spreading in the field of
legislation and the judiciary. It is worth noting that the emergence of
those new criteria of decision-making, the reference to "presumptive
consequences," is driven exactly by the effort to project in the "present
future" the "future presents." Luhmann considers this astonishing effort
as the ultimate attempt to give form to legal concepts, even if it is
through social processes that tend to conflate innovation and variation
in the absence of stabilization: "If there are ever to be legal concepts
which are socially adequate, they will have to be found through a
testing and re-testing of solutions to establish potential eigenvalues of
the legal system in modern society."8 1 We can call it abstinence from
clear and sound principles. That is why law is looking for self-produced
eigenvalues. Inside the system of law, this abstinence is not welcomed.
Making decisions about hard cases, for example, where existing and
valid legal norms do not lead to unequivocal decisions, is a paradoxical
activity. One must decide by relying on recorded "precedents"
(abstracted rules for conflicts), but that is impossible. Here, judges have
to decide without a valid rule of decision-making and have to leave it
contested. They can only "oscillate" between the values of the
legal/illegal code. That is why the institutions of legal force or "objective
responsibility" emerge, trying to stop the circular regression of legal
argumentations. And, finally, that is why, if the court cannot find a law
to enforce, it must create one. Courts have abandoned the retrospective
temporal perspective favored by traditional jurisprudence, and as
Scheuerman attests, the tendency toward creative judicial activity and
interpretation is now nearly universal.
80. Id. at 411.
81. Id. at 473.
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C. From the Modern Separation of Powers and Temporal Division of
Labor to the Emergence of a New Temporal Hierarchy
The separation of powers (institutional units, body of personnel, and
functional activities), probably the most important aspect of
constitutionalism, is based on clear assumptions about temporality.
Liberal democrats accepted the idea that legislation refers to the
making of new laws and statutes; execution means enacting those laws,
and judicial power entails declaring what is right in the event of
controversy. Scheuerman underlines this latent temporal subtext,
indicating that legislation is conceived as a prospective and
future-oriented activity; "[J]udicial activity is fundamentally
retrospective, or past-oriented; and the executive is contemporaneous or
present-oriented." 82 In a nutshell, the modern constitutional division of
powers reproduces inside its institutions the temporal division of past,
present, and future. Another way to understand this division is to
connect the value of deliberation with legislative powers and
parliaments and those of action with executive powers. In the modern
liberal tradition, legislation and lawmaking are connected with the idea
of a slow, reasonable, rational, inclusive, open, transparent, and
competent discussion. Parliaments are the places where the value of
political representation is enacted. And discussing before deciding takes
a lot of time. Legislation is a very time-consuming activity. What does it
mean for an accelerated society? From a modern point of view, it means
that deliberative procedures have to adapt to the new temporal
situation, trying to improve their modern ideals. Contemporary
theorists of deliberative or participative democracy picture political
debate as requiring pompous normative ideals of equality, reciprocity,
openness, perfect information, and more inclusiveness than previous
forms of democracy. 83 A huge part of the current debate is devoted to
looking for new technologies capable of improving popular deliberation
and direct citizen lawmaking and proposing universal distribution of
these new time-saving technologies. 84 Not to say about the huge
82. SCHEUERMAN, supra note 69, at 29.
83. See Bob Jessop, The Spatiotemporal Dynamics of Globalizing Capital and Their
Impact on State Power and Democracy, in HIGH-SPEED SOCIETY: SOCIAL ACCELERATION,
POWER, AND MODERNITY, supra note 2, at 135.
84. The literature about democracy, political participation, new methods of political
decision, and the impact of new technologies is enormous. Only as introduction, see JOHN
0. McGINNIs, ACCELERATING DEMOCRACY: TRANSFORMING GOVERNANCE THROUGH
TECHNOLOGY (2012); DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP: THE INTERNET, SOCIETY, AND PARTICIPATION
(Karen Mossberger, Caroline J. Tolbert & Ramona S. McNeal eds., 2007); IAN BUDGE, THE
NEW CHALLENGE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY (1996); DIGITAL DEMOCRACY AND THE IMPACT OF
TECHNOLOGY ON GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS: NEW GLOBALIZED PRACTICES (Christina M.
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questions concerning how technologies will affect law in the near
future.8 5
But all these attempts at improving the deliberation process lead
directly to a new dilemma: whether to increase participation and
time-consuming procedures or to delegate regulatory authority, thus
speeding up deliberation but losing representativeness. The same
dilemma concerns the ideal of an active citizenship-well-informed,
politically committed, interested in civic participation, and competent in
public debates-and citizens dimly interested, "bowling alone," and
connected with the public from time to time.86 Many scholars talk about
political apathy, the loss of political vision and narrative, civic
disorientation or anomia, intolerance towards time-consuming political
debates, and a deep "political deterioration" in the quality of citizenship.
It is here that the paradox of political time, as explained by Hartmut
Rosa, can be understood.8 7 The contraction of the temporal horizon in
high-speed society increases the scarcity of time resources, and, because
of the contraction of the present, the horizon of rational calculability
decreases, the time-span for decisions decreases, and the number of
necessary decisions increases, thus again reducing the available time
per decision. This means that the temporal range of the effects of
decisions increases; the demand for collective regulation in consequence
of growing contingencies increases; and the political and cultural
common ground for decision-making shrinks because of the increase of
cultural pluralism (as the works of William E. Connolly and James
Tully demonstrate).8 8 The effect of these two parallel processes is the
transfer of decision-making from parliaments and other modern
institutions to faster systems.89 The time of a parliamentary democracy
cannot begin, for it is projected toward the untouchable horizon of a
utopian participatory democracy or exploited as a technical device for
Akrivopoulou & Nicolaos Garipidis eds., 2013); CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2013) (discussing the
consequences of new technologies on constitutional values); see also Giulia Dessi, The
Icelandic Constitutional Experiment, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Oct. 23, 2012),
http://www.opendemocracy.net/giulia-dessilicelandic-constitutional-experiment.
85. THE LAW OF FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF LAW: VOLUME II (Sam Muller, Stavros
Zouridis, Morly Feishman & Laura Kistemaker, eds., 2012).
86. See William E. Scheuerman, Citizenship and Speed, in HIGH-SPEED SOCIETY: SOCIAL
ACCELERATION, POWER, AND MODERNITY, supra note 2, at 287.
87. See ALIENATION, supra note 5.
88. William E. Connolly, Speed, Concentric Cultures, and Cosmopolitanism, in
HIGH-SPEED SOCIETY: SOCIAL ACCELERATION, POWER, AND MODERNITY, supra note 2, at
261; TULLY, supra note 12.
89. Beginning with CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY (1988)
to end with all the critics of the malfunctioning and the democratic illegitimacy (or
weakness) of the European Parliament.
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"motorized" legislature as Carl Schmitt predicted in the 1950s.9o The
two fastest systems with the capacity to compensate for the ineptitude
of legislatures could be the executive and the judicial branches. The
former had its time, at least at the national level, in the 1980s,
sustained by the (very simple) hopes for their political consistency.
Decrees and orders were the solutions to every problem, and
presidential and semi-presidential regimes were the best institutional
devices. The fields of intervention were foreign political crises, sudden
economic downturns, and civil disorder.91 The traditional metaphor of a
unitary executive, however, proved to be wrong because of the
complexity of any administrative action, a divided state, and the ever
growing and chaotic composition of executive bodies.
The real winner in the debate between Schmitt and Frank was most
likely Jerome Frank and his powerful idea of the judicial answer to
social acceleration. 92 Courts (first of all constitutional courts),
arbitration bodies, and their accelerated kin are identified with a
reduced emphasis on legal precedents and preexisting standing rules.
For instance, the procedures of the many international business
arbitration panels emphasize speed, the abandonment of
time-consuming technicalities, and the formalities of traditional
adjudications. In a sense, we can talk about a double movement
concerning the temporal division of labor in traditional liberal
democratic institutions. The first movement is from the modern
centrality of legislative power toward the accelerating decision-making
procedures of government-like institutions. In high-speed society,
general legislative debate is shortened or sped up. Deliberation is
compressed in small collegial bodies or committees in which "expert"
opinions may be accelerated. 93 It is evident that the construction of
political consensus, too, will change greatly within this new frame. The
second temporal shift is from the centrality of the "dispatching" and
''energetic" executives toward a new centrality of courts: "Like
parliament, the judiciary might imitate the executive and thereby
streamline its tempo in accordance with social acceleration but only at
the cost of abandoning its special normative and institutional
attributes." 94 By now, it is quite evident that high-speed society drives
90. Carl Schmitt, The Motorized Legislator, in HIGH-SPEED SOCIETY: SOCIAL
ACCELERATION, POWER, AND MODERNITY, supra note 2, at 65.
91. William E. Scheuerman, Emergency Powers, 2 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCl. 257, 264
(2006).
92. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
93. See generally and only for the EU, 21ST CENTURY COIVHTOLOGY: IMPLEMENTING
COMMITTEES IN THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION (Thomas Christiansen, Johanna Miriam
Oettel & Beatrice Vaccari eds., 2009).
94. SCHEUERMAN, supra note 69, at 58.
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us toward an accelerated normative culture. What does this culture
mean for the very idea of constitution and constitutionalism?
V. CONSTITUTIONS AS STRUCTURAL COUPLINGS AND STRUCTURAL
COUPLINGS AS TEMPORAL COUPLINGS
It is time to explain the emergence of modern constitutions as a
temporal problem. Within the framework of systemic theory, it is
necessary to distinguish two different but interrelated subjects: (1) the
difference between operative and structural couplings; and (2) the
difference between synchronicity and synchronization. Given the
operative closure of autopoietic systems, it is necessary to distinguish
between "operative" and "structural" couplings. Operative couplings are
twofold; on the one hand, they refer to the coupling of operations within
operations, that is, autopoiesis, and, on the other hand, operative
couplings concern the coupling between systemic operations and those
operations that systems attribute to the environment. Both are only
possible in the present, event after event: they emerge because of the
synchronicity between systems and environments.9 5 These connections
are relevant but too volatile to allow the establishment of a durable,
stable relationship. From an evolutionary point of view, however,
certain ongoing relationships between social subsystems occur with the
emergence of "structural" couplings. Here, structural means "endowed
with a duration and stability." A single operation can be attributed
simultaneously, but with a different meaning, to more than one
subsystem. Enduring couplings simultaneously reduce and facilitate the
influences of the environment (i.e. other subsystems) on the system.
Reduce means both limit and enable: reduction and limitation are
necessary conditions for enabling.9 6
If you conceive a constitution as a limitation of powers (economic,
political, or scientific), you are faced with a double paradox.
Constitutions protect citizens, entitling them with individual rights and
enabling them in a positive way: these enabling rights are useful only if
they are, at the same time, partially disabled or limited.9 7 Natural
"freedom and equality," the basic rights needed for modern political
inclusion, must be limited, as occurred in the early contractualist legacy
and in the famous "right of resistance." These limitations (negative
constitutionalism) enable freedom and equality values (positive
constitutionalism) and, through individual rights, enforce these values
95. For the theory of structural coupling, see NIKLAS LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY,
VOLUME 1 (2012).
96. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 381-423 (discussing structural couplings).
97. See THORNHILL, supra note 32.
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within society.98 In a sense, constitutions mold the societal political
sphere by depoliticizing it and giving shape to the foundation of law by
delegalizing it. The reciprocity between disablements and enablements
and limitations and constitutions led modern Western society toward
the search for a "single formula" capable of symbolically explaining the
unity of society.99
The paradoxes of couplings were first superseded by the idea of the
social contract and then by the establishment of the rule of law.100
Modern territorial nation-states selected their mission as the unification
of valid law and legitimate public powers within their territorial
boundaries. A constitution
functions as a schema which makes it possible to define
two reverse perspectives as a unity and to celebrate it as
an achievement of civilization: the juridical shackling of
political force and the political exploitation of law....
Accordingly, there is a juridical framing of state-issued
decisions and finally a juridical concept of the state as a
point of reference for all decisions that are supposed to
be collectively binding from the perspective of the
political system. Seen from the perspective of the legal
system, decisions have this effect only if they are lawful
and not in contravention to law. o
Constitutions work as a taken-for-granted and lasting framework
for enabling legitimate and lawful powers, i.e. self-limited public
powers. That is why, as long as there was no constitution in the modern
sense of the term, the problem of resistance remained the core problem
of the modern state at the point where the law conflicts with politics. As
Luhmann emphasized, "[h]ere lies the hidden motif of all theories built
on the unity of politics and law. In other words, the difference between
the legal system and the political system can be understood, under the
prevailing premises, as legitimate resistance to the political exercise of
power."102 It is worth noting that before the emergence of constitutions
and the clear distinction between politics and law, the right of
98. For the distinction between negative/positive constitutionalism and enabling/disabling
constitutionalism, see generally HOLMES, supra note 17.
99. See Chris Thornhill, Niklas Luhmann and the Sociology of the Constitution, 10 J.
CLASSICAL Soc. 315, 321 (2010) (arguing that the sociology of constitutions has been an
important, but submerged, area of sociological inquiry).
100. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 423-63.
101. Id. at 368-69 (emphasis removed).
102. Id. at 361.
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resistance could only be understood as a danger for the unity of society
because every individual might intervene in politics, destroying
peace.103
Constitutions contribute to the process of functional differentiation
by enabling social systems to produce more complexity in the circulation
of powers and in their legal securitization via rights. Complexity is
viable only if channeled into structures of expectations so that one can
expect to link one's operations with other socially expected operations.
This does not mean that constitutions can unify politics and law at one
stroke. Politics is not an ongoing interpretation and enactment of a
legally fixed constitution, and the legal system is not continuously
committed to the implementation of political programs and plans.
Politics and the legal system remain different subsystems with
idiosyncratic time horizons, and it becomes increasingly improbable that
the latter could find a simple synchronization.
The operative time frames of subsystems are autonomous. Law has
its time frames (procedural time limits, limitations period, appeals, and
exchanges of legal correspondence) that do not fit with the times of
politics (parliamentary session, consultations period, public
announcement, political campaign, construction of public opinion, not to
mention the activities of political parties). Even if from an external
point of view, the enactment of legislation can be seen as an event
pertaining to both the legal and the political system, each subsystem
treats legislation its own way. Politics will work legislation out through
preparative communications, political negotiations, political exchanges,
consultations, debates, and votes, which normally are not even
registered by the legal system unless the legal system needs these
measures to reconstruct the intentions of politicians. Social subsystems
grow older together, but they process their own temporal contexts in
different ways. Time passes for all, but each subsystem articulates time
for its own purposes: system and environment irritate themselves on the
basis of the specific system's time frame. Each system registers the
irritations by coding them into a historic time, a memory structure, or
an identity. The irritating event is only possible if it is projected into the
structures of expectations, which create the history of the system.104 It
is only with the help of these immunity structures that the system can
try to find quick solutions to the irritations and prepare for what may
happen.
103. For this problem, see QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL
THOUGHT, VOL. 2: THE AGE OF REFORMATION (1978).
104. Very useful here is HISTORIES OF NATIONS: How THEIR IDENTITIES WERE FORGED
(Peter Furtado ed., 2013).
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Coupled systems react to reciprocal irritations at different speeds.
Their speed depends on their structures and, therefore, on their
histories and identities. Structural coupling guarantees only the
synchronicity of the system and the environment for a single given
event, but not synchronization. Here, synchronicity means that the
specific corridors linking politics and law were constructed to permit
mutual irritations and that corridors can endure for sometime: everyone
can expect that politics is legalized and that law is an instrument for
politics. In other words, law "provides immunity structures, which
prevent ongoing disappointment from resulting in the annulment of the
structures."1os Restricting the reciprocal influence of law and politics
means simultaneously increasing their operative possibilities in the
framework of their coupling. By limiting contacts, more possibilities are
created for the legal system to register political decisions in a legal form
and for the political system to use the law for the implementation and
enactment of its own policies. Since then, a "constitution has been
understood as [a] positive statute law, which constitutes positive law
itself and through that regulates how political power[s] can be organized
and implemented in a legal form with legally mandated restrictions."10 6
VI. CONSTITUTIONS AS ATTEMPTS TO SYNCHRONIZE POLITICS AND LAW:
THE PROBLEM OF THE TEMPORAL IDENTITY OF CONSTITUTIONS
Modern constitutions (e.g. the American and French ones) were and
are presented in history as revolutionary and as "the accelerated
concentration of all possible histories."10 7 This "beginning" (its empirical
and historical accuracy notwithstanding) put them in a strange
temporal landscape. In the first instance, modern constitutions were
presented against the old times and the old political and legal structure
as path-breaking institutions that were to be renewed by each new
generation.10 8 This first vision introduced the constitution as an event, a
novelty, and a denial of past times that characterized constituent power
as a political power immune from the past and able to fully rewrite the
basic social compact. This was of course a very modern and progressive
time: a revolutionary present with a future that might begin. At the
same time, to be a temporal and enduring structure of expectations, the
constitution needed to exceed the present and proclaim itself as a
time-binding and synchronizing coupling between politics and law.
Furthermore, if it has to work as an established rule of the game,
105. Id. at 384.
106. Id. at 405.
107. Koselleck, supra note 2, at 126.
108. See generally ANTONIO NEGRI & MICHAEL HARDT, COMMONWEALTH (2011).
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written law is conceived as if its norms could bind and thereby
coordinate social and political actors. As the higher law, the constitution
is supposed to foresee the future for the sake of channeling the
operations of state authority, and it should aspire to do so for an
indefinite time.
For constitutions, time is out of joint! Its flexibility collides with its
stability. To change or not to change: this is the problem! The early
debates on modern constitutions are full of these clashes between
divergent values. Stephen Holmes has a clear image of this paradox in
his famous book Passions and Constraint, where he defines the solution
as the choice of constitutional precommitment or the practice of
self-binding or self-incapacitation, in the present, of a collectivity. For
sure, this highlights another temporal paradox. 109 The question is well
known: Why should a constitutional framework, ratified long ago, exert
such an enormous power over the lives of present-day citizens? Why
should we accept the contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous? Why
should we accept a past that does not want to pass?
In modern liberal theory, this problem is framed as a possible
tension between constitutionalism and democracy or constituted and
constituting power. From the point of view of democracy, a constitution
is a collective device with the (negative) function of eliminating certain
decisions (future possibilities) from the democratic process or limiting
the power of government. Citizens need a constitution just as Ulysses
needed to be bound to his mast. Before the very idea of
constitutionalism was equated with this limiting vision, a huge debate
took place for almost two centuries (from the eighteenth to the
twentieth century).
In the beginning of the debate about constitutions, from David
Hume to Thomas Paine or Thomas Jefferson to Alexander Hamilton and
James Madison, the general idea was against the time-binding power of
constitutions. In a nutshell, a founding generation could never commit
its successors to a fixed constitutional scheme. The positive value was
attached to the possible alterations of any law. Among customary
arguments, the principle was that no father can rightfully bind his sons.
Antitraditionalism, antipatriarchalism, and the denial of inherited
goods and properties were the building blocks of the debate over
constitutions. For Paine, democracy was the rule of the living and a war
against the past: nobility was no-ability.110 The past must not flood the
109. HOLMES, supra note 17. See generally Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the
Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195 (Jon Elster & Rune
Slagstad eds., 1988). All the next argumentations are based on that essay.
110. Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man in THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS
PAINE 251 (1961).
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present and the future, exactly as it cannot happen for the protestant
contractual marriage. Marriage was an ongoing negation of the
possibility of divorce: the future was a viable horizon opened up by
negation of positive possibilities. The only valid consent was the consent
of the living, i.e. the consent of the present. Thomas Jefferson declared
the self-sufficiency of any generation, and believed that no possible
Fatherland was able to "compact" the living, the dead, and the unborn.
As Holmes underlines, Jefferson went so far as to deny all ordinary
assumptions about historical continuity and, thus, national identity.
Each generation is as independent as the generation it precedes. That is
why national constitutional plebiscites should be held every twenty or
thirty years.
The whole debate was funneled by the new semantic of the modern
sciences, the positivization of law and all other forms of temporalization
of complexity. Another problematic semantic was that of the early
nation-state, with its ideals of popular sovereignty, individualistic
citizenship, and immunization from state powers. Here again, we find a
problem of identity-that is of temporal continuity. If medieval
"constitutions" were thought of as contracts between the king and the
various estates considered as separate parties, modern constitutions are
typically intended as legal frameworks that "the people" give themselves
(with all the well-known paradoxes of the "present absence" of the
People as constituent power). A binding promise requires two parties
and cannot be performed by one party alone.
Within the temporal frame of "presentism," constitutional theory
was unable to make progress. If it is impossible to bind ourselves in the
present, no constitution is logically possible, simply because nonreal
identity is possible. Identity is a form that binds the past with the
future in an enduring present. How was it then possible to overcome the
prohibition against one generation binding the next and then the
impossibility of an individual (a collective we) making a binding promise
to himself (or themselves)? As usual, the solution came from the
secularization of a theological Roman Catholic metaphorology-another
temporal solution to be sure.' Bootstrapping was not yet possible, so
the only solution was to attach the constitution to an external enforcer:
externalize your problems and let God do the rest! But this simple
external solution was disabled because of the emerging semantics of
auto-referentiality, which prohibited any heteronomy: what was needed
was a self-limiting image.
111. See generally FRANCIS OAKLEY, OMNIPOTENCE, COVENANT, AND ORDER: AN
ExCURSION IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS FROM ABELARD TO LEIBNIZ (1984).
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Of course the omnipotence of a self-binding God is better if
internally auto-differentiated. Jean Bodin was the first to adopt the
theological argument of a God able to commit himself.112 Surprisingly
enough, the theoretician of absolute sovereignty was also the father of
positive constitutionalism. Holmes sums up this constitutional
argumentation in such a way: "[C]onstitutional restrictions are less
limits on, than expressions of, sovereign freedom and power."113 From
Bodin to Madison and beyond, constitutional theorists describe the
function of constitutions not only as limiting power but also as creating
and assigning it to cement and secure the collective "we," to establish
and activate democracy. 114 And with Article V, the framers of the U.S.
Constitution found a new way to change it by making the amendment
(self-modification) process complicated and time-consuming. The
problem was, as usual, tapped in the core of the constitution, within its
very identity: to be a legal-political frame for a collective and
self-constituting "we."1 1 5 From this point of view, it is simple to
understand the basic idea of limiting the power of any given majority to
grant power to all future majorities. The common metaphors of
checking, blocking, limiting, and dividing powers prevent the majority
from abusing its power. This is also why the figure of Ulysses binding
himself is not enough-he did not constitute himself When constitution
makers attempt to bind the future they are not simply trying to exercise
control or foreclose options: they create and open unprecedented
possibilities that would otherwise lie beyond reach. And the most
important possibility is the "constitutional pre-commitment," the
absolute decision to avoid self-destruction or self-disconstitution.
From a temporal point of view, constitutions regulate the
constitutional check on ordinary law and in what ways the latter may
exempt itself from the rule that new law breaks old. This represented a
paradoxical shift from the past to the future as the pivotal temporal
reference for the law:
[T]he constitution also ended the old law's openness to
the past and replaced it with openness to the future.
This means that arguments based on historical claims
112. JEAN BODIN THE Six BOOKS OF COMMONWEALE I, 10, 162 (1962).
113. HOLMES, supra note 17, at 151 (emphasis removed).
114. For an introduction to the issue of corporate agents, see CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP
PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS
(2011).
115. Riccardo Prandini, Reflexive Social Subjectivities, in ENGAGING WITH THE WORLD:
AGENCY, INSTITUTIONS, HISTORICAL FORMATIONS 50-77 (Margaret S. Archer & Andrea M.
Maccarini eds., 2013).
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also had to be measured against the constitution, and
conversely that the constitution normalized the
procedure of the ongoing change of law. To achieve this,
constitutions prescribe legislation, which is to be
negotiated by parliament and to be formed juridically. 116
The legal system generates a mechanism, secured by constitutional
self-exemption, to pronounce itself illegal. Every norm could be
unconstitutional, except for the constitution. As a consequence, the
institution that can declare the unconstitutionality of all the statutes
should perform a judicial function, not an executive or a legislative one.
The separation of powers is a solution to the problem that emerged only
when all the laws became positivized and alterable at will. The
constitution must be exempted from the usual procedures applied to
change the law, but, at the same time, changing and updating the
constitution becomes more and more relevant and can be achieved only
by interpretation. From the legal perspective, a constitution is a
(positive) basic statute that needs to be interpreted and applied. It
includes values as general points of interpretative reference and as
rules for the closure of an otherwise ever-open horizon for
argumentation. From a political point of view, the focal point concerns
sovereignty-that is how to avoid arbitrariness at the top of the system
and how to bind sovereignty to its communicated promises.
Constitutional interpretations increasingly has become a political
issue. Trying to decide changes reveals a number of different values in
the constitutional text and no radical rules for conflicts between them.
It is precisely here that the operative closure of the two systems (politics
and law) is clearly visible. Political actors search for and find political
arguments: the legal system decides if the arguments are legally fitting.
Values, value programs, and political utopias strike again, so that
whereas value concepts have gone out of fashion everywhere else, "they
can still be found in the decision-making of the Constitutional
Court-and in the commitments of the programmes of political
parties."117 Nevertheless, the problem still remains on the ground
because the prohibition on changing the law could be changed by law
indefinitely. "This problem cannot be contained normatively[,] [i]t has to
be [G]6delized in the direction of politics."118
This Godelization, in turn, reveals that the modern equilibrium of
constitutional change is, again, deranged by post-modern processes. One
of the most relevant of such processes is social acceleration, which risks
116. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 406.
117. Id. at 121.
118. Id. at 126 (emphasis removed).
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favoring insufficiently democratic mechanisms for constitutional change
or adaptation. Not only is the pace of change requested by high-speed
society increasing, but also the very idea of maintaining a stable
constitutional identity turns out to be "improbable and out-of-fashion."
All of the four typical ways of constitutional change are at risk. The
"dualistic" system of formal amendment, based on the separation
between ordinary lawmaking and higher constitutional legislation,
ensures a higher level of democratic legitimacy than the one found in
ordinary decision-making, but this system has to proceed slowly and
deliberately to decelerate political debates in order to ensure their
reasonable and sound character. The results, in the age of acceleration,
are inefficiency, impossibility to change, and dramatic
desynchronization between law and politics. Judicial review by
constitutional courts is much more adapted to societal acceleration, but
high-speed societal processes tend to transform constitutional courts
into constitutional assemblies in permanent session. The pressures to
modify constitutional principles in order to adapt them to social change
push the courts to conflate legal interpretation (based on the principle of
"stare decisis") with sheer legal creativity.1 19 This conflation leads
toward the deconstruction of the difference between law (interpretation)
and politics (modification) and, consequently, toward a democratic
deficit. Constitutional change via elected legislatures could be faster
than the dualistic system and is actually set forward as a proposal for
the new constitution. 120 But again, there is a risk of losing the
distinction between constitutional and ordinary law. Furthermore, this
mechanism needs a very reasonable and skilled assembly, and this is
not always the case. An example of this device, which might be useful
for post-sovereign constitutions, is the two-stage process where initial
round table negotiations with power holders establish the grand rules
for an elected assembly writing the new constitution (overviewed by a
constitutional court).12 1 This process, however, seems to take a lot of
time. Finally, executive-driven constitutional change appears to be very
fast but much too unbalanced in terms of power. The rhetoric of "agere
us deliberare" (to act versus to deliberate) is not easily controllable;
moreover, the executive is not always simple and unitary.
119. See SCHEUERMAN, supra note 69.
120. See generally Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional
Revision in Eastern Europe, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 275, 294-99 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (proposing a
legislature-dominated system of constitutional amendment in Eastern Europe based on
the underlying unique circumstances in that region's transition from socialism to
constitutional democracy).
121. See generally Andrew Arato, Multi-Track Constitutionalism Beyond Carl Schmitt,
18 CONSTELLATIONS 324 (2011).
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The problems arising from social acceleration lead us again toward
societal constitutionalism. What does it mean for the emerging
constitutional processes, concerning global, functionally differentiated
social spheres, to enter the age of speed? What kind of lesson can
provide us with reflections on state constitutions? I want to suggest
three new issues: 1) the pointlessness of representing constitutional
processes as driven by unitary and simple stable actors; 2) the new and
increasing relevance of international courts or bodies of arbitration in
starting up constitutional processes; and 3) the growing importance of
human rights in the constitutional framing of global social systems.
VII. EXAMPLES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN A HIGH-SPEED SOCIETY:
POST-SOVEREIGN CONSTITUENT POWERS, DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS COURTS,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
In this final section, I would like to show in a very tentative and
synthetic way some insights that derive from shifting the analytical
frame of reference from spatial to temporal metaphors. First, I want to
stress a very important point in the debate on societal
constitutionalism, which remains latent but pervasive. It is quite clear
that many scholars prefer to frame the debate via the concept of
"constitutionalization" instead of "constitution." In my opinion, this
preference depends on the temporalization of society. For sure, framing
the normative and jus-generative processes concerning the
self-limitation-through secondary ruling of primary rules-of global
social subsystems directly into the concept of constitution could be a
little misleading. This is neither because of old, obsolete, and
methodological nationalism nor because of the well-known criticism
about the absence of a clear and legitimate polity, authoritative
organizations, and centers of powers. The point is, first, that the new
processes of global societal self-constitutionalization seem to
institutionalize faster but in different ways than the modern ones. In
those cases, some of the relevant features of modern state constitutions
seem to be absent. Some examples of those deficits are the absence of an
ultimate "We the People" of clear and stable stakeholders engaging in
the constitutional processes of representative executive and legislative
bodies. Second, one should not take for granted that this kind of
constitutionalization necessarily emerges "inside" organizations. It can
be said that global constitutionalism may also develop when forced and
compelled from its "outside," that is, from the different environments of
law and politics. We could talk of "constitutionalism without
constitutions" exactly as it is possible to talk about "constitutions
765
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
without constitutionalism," for instance in the case of China. 122 To argue
this point, I select only three aspects of the ongoing processes of global
constitutionalization, but I am sure that framing the current debate
within this new interpretative key (temporalization) would enable us to
find many other examples or to accomplish many case studies.
The first example has to do with the growing improbability that
new, self-constituting polities (the self-constituting collectivities or
"subjectivities") may find their legitimacy in their past (it does not
matter whether real of fictional), and/or from the problematic presence
of "We the People." Not only does the new pouvoir constituant
(constituent power) not refer to any past legacy, but it tends to project
its self-constitution into the future, allowing a variety of interested
actors to connect/not connect to a "center of political gravity" that we
can call a "political hub" (and not a representative unity at all). We can
observe "strange attractors," bundles of interests/identities that are
never completely closed and do not rule out the possibility that multiple
actors will connect to and participate, for a short or long time, with an
ever-constituting and operating collective self.123
The clear and well-defined political unity of government is replaced
by a fuzzy and nebulous "magnetic field" constituted by different and
networked actors that the field finds useful to connect to a hub. In an
evolutionary perspective, this means that the clear origin of
constitutions is replaced by situations in which organizations that are
already following legal norms find it useful to regulate these operative
rules with constitutive metarules. An interesting and clear example of
this "escape from the present" of representative pouvoir constituant is
given by the work of Andrew Arato, concerning what he calls
"past-sovereign constitution making."1 24 Arato began studying the
drafting of constitutions in Hungary after the liberation of East
European countries from Soviet dominance in 1989-90.125 He framed
postsovereign constitutions (not only in Eastern Europe, but also in
122. E.g., BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA (St6phanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle
eds., 2009); Antonin Cohen, Constitutionalism Without Constitution: Transnational Elites
Between Political Mobilization and Legal Expertise in the Making of a Constitution for Europe
(1940s-1960s), 32 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 109 (2007) (analyzing how legal elites have altered and
continue to alter the European transnational order).
123. E.g., David Sciulli, Societal Constitutionalism: Procedural Legality and Legitimation in
Global and Civil Society, in LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: NORMATIVE AND SOCIOLOGICAL
APPROACHES 103 (Chris Thornhill & Samantha Ashenden eds., 2010) (discussing the
constitutional relevance of the many and different collegial formations, reflection centers, and
social movements in civil society).
124. Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution-Making and Its Pathology in Iraq, 15
N.Y.U. L. REV., 536-55 (2006-2007).
125. ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY, CONSTITUTION AND LEGITIMACY (1999).
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South Africa, Spain, and other countries) as path-breaking political
innovations because of the postmodern social mechanism of "negotiate
transitions" from dictatorship to a democratic regime. 126 As he
underlined, the year 1989 did produce something dramatically new: a
political paradigm of radical transformation yielding a historically new,
superior model of constitutional creation beyond the revolutionary
democratic European models.
The postsovereign model entails a two-stage process of transition
from dictatorship to constitutional democracy. The first stage concerns
the organization of thick round table negotiations attended by both the
previous power holders and the present and future significant social
voices (all present and future stakeholders). This first collective
negotiation, which has a place without the fiction of a "we" composed by
equal individuals, establishes the ground or constitutive rules (usually
an interim constitution) for the second stage, where an elected assembly
actually writes the new, ultimate constitution. Here, constituent power
is not embodied in a single organ or instance endowed with the
plenitude of powers but in a host of different and already constituted
"parts" of the society, negotiating for a new and plural constituted
power. Between the two stages, the constitutional court gives significant
overview to the process by ensuring that the elected constitutional
assembly abides by the ground rules decided during round table talks. 127
It is worth noting that at least two components play a fundamental
role in the drafting process: drafting the interim constitution (the round
table of major political forces) and the drafting the final document,
which is always conducted by a freely elected body that should not be
called a constitutional assembly. The drafting process should be
characterized by broad social inclusion, equality, transparency, and
publicity. With this mechanism, constitutionalism abandons the
mythology of "We the People" as the ultimate sovereign authority able
to speak in an unmediated form and reactivates the model of a
constitution created and enacted by different and plural actors. The
result is a deconstruction of any "part" claiming to represent (again the
present) the people. As Arato declares,
[w]hat in the single-stage model is a single set of
utterances, made by one speaker(s) in the name of
another subject that never speaks, becomes two, with
two acting subjects, in two distinct stages, with
126. ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION (2009).
127. Andrew Arato, Conventions, Constituent Assemblies, and Round Tables: Models,
Principles and Elements of Democratic Constitution-Making, 1 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
173-200 (2012).
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ascending but never complete legitimacy. Unlike the
speaker of the classical populist model, the speaker of
neither stage here is able to fully identify itself with the
popular sovereign . . . The speaker(s) who write an
interim constitution speak at the same time directly in
the name of political organizations and establish a
process by which a democratically authorized set of
speaker(s) can be elected.128
In this sense, some pouvoir constitud is always part of the
constituant. The entire model based on the idea of an actor acting for a
principal is deconstructed, as in the model of a direct-deliberative
poliarchy elaborated by Charles Sabel.129 The past, which is the
ready-made, reenters the present and both open up possibilities for the
future.
It is worth noting that postsovereign constitutions (the model I
would generalize to societal constitutionalism), characterized as they
are by the cooperation of many collective (and not individual) actors and
some (already made) powers, usually operate with different
"proceedings" to reconstruct their self-constituting and pluralistic
identity. Here, we can find the (always undervalued) "political" core of
societal constitutionalism. It is fundamental to observe the
constitutional process from a double point of observation. From one
point of view, the function of law is just to guarantee the certainty of
expectations (to code every communication using the legal-illegal code);
the system is invariant only in the structural form of its code: it is
always eager to be adapted or transformed into the self-produced
uncertainty of an open future. 3 0 Only the code can produce the
uncertainty in which the proceedings feed. The proceedings use
uncertainties to call for contributions, encourage participation, offer
opportunities, and thus invite participants to cooperate, that is, to
acknowledge acceptance until the participants finally become prisoners
of their own participation with only a very slight prospect of contesting
the legitimacy of the proceedings after they have run their course.
128. Andrew Arato, Redeeming the Still Redeemable: Post Sovereign Constitution
Making, 22 INT'L. J. POL. CULTURE SOc'Y 427, 439 (2009).
129. Charles F. Sabel & Oliver Gerstenberg, Constitutionalising an Overlapping
Consensus: The ECJ and the Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order, 16 EUR. L.J.
511, 543-50 (2010) (connecting the "jurisprudence of mutual monitoring to ... to the idea
of deliberative polyarchy").
130. About this form of proceedings and the opening of future, see LUHMANN, supra note
65.
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From the other point of view, the function of politics is to ensure the
efficient implementation of collectively binding decisions. Power is
ultimately the generalized capacity of an organization to establish and
enforce collectively binding decisions. 3 1 Power tries to bring together
opinions in such a way that collectively binding decisions can be made.
Using legal procedures, the political system can futurize itself so it can
gain time and be able to operate before definitive decisions are taken.
Here again, we can observe the structural coupling between politics and
law. For the political system, law is an instrument for the facilitation
and realization of its goals and plans. In the age of globalization and
acceleration, a legal system is increasingly a precondition for the
making of (nonstate) policies. At the same time, the system of law can
develop only if cooperation is secured politically and the enforceability of
decisions is secured elsewhere.
An example of a postsovereign constitution sustained by
legal-political procedures is brilliantly presented by Jaye Ellis in his
work, Forest Stewardship or the Marine Stewardship Council.132 The
Council is "constituted" by networks of governance actors including
scientists, governments, media, industry actors, and members of civil
society. The Council's goal is to deliver its certification programs in the
environment of the consumers. The Council works to create a present
future where governance structures and decision-making processes are
legitimate but not democratically representative, and it operates to
render its future presents as transparent, responsive, accountable, and
accessible to affected actors as possible. The Council's interest is to link
the present networks with other regimes to build up meta networks.
The authority of these organizations is not dependent on formal
legislative enactment, on pregiven constitutional provisions, or on
elections (the basic principles of modern political representativeness).
The organizations construct their legitimacy as collective organizations
through the inclusion of stakeholders called on to comment on draft
legislations. The point I want to underline, and which I think might be
generalized in the majority of cases concerning societal
constitutionalism, is that the pluralistic and internally heterogeneous
"we" self-constitute themselves "in time," permitting their stakeholders
to interact and participate in the proceedings and create various
channels for feedback and openness for a range of different voices. 133
131. Talcott Parsons, On the Concept of Political Power, Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society 107 (1963).
132. See Jay Ellis, Constitutionalization of Nongovernmental Certification Programs, 20
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1035 (2013).
133. It would be interesting to open a dialogue with Hans Lindahl, concerning the
self-constitution of a collective "We." In general, I fully agree with him on the relevance of the
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They maintain their future open for accessing and connecting to
decision-making fora, critique fora, third-party observations, consumer
opinions, and state-based authorities. In each and every one of these
processes and structures, the basic goal is to render the actions of
"government" influenced, calculable, and open for every actor to
participate. The higher value is not the definitive character of decisions
and norms but their "determinability" in the future presents. That is
why Ellis can conclude his paper by affirming that "at the present, the
emphasis is on legitimacy and credibility rather than validity, and the
rule of law is only weakly present."134 From my point of view, this is
exactly what happened with the temporalization of the validity of law.
Politics operate here to make the rules respectable and credible, even if
not yet formally valid. And the polity of this council is opened to access
and recess. 135
The same is true for the case study presented by Moritz Renner
about the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).136 This
Board, which produces the International Financial Reporting Standard
(IFRS), is overseen by the IFRS foundation, which has given itself a
constitution. This constitution foresees that the IASB shall publish an
exposure draft on all projects and normally publish a discussion
document for public comment on major projects in accordance with
procedures approved by the trustees. After a public consultation process
has been made, the standards are finalized and pipelined to the
jurisdictional adoption process. Renner explains that in a typical
consultation procedure, comment letters and commentaries are issued
by hundreds of stakeholders, including legal corporations, private and
public business associations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
public authorities, and academics. The relevant point is that the
self-constitutive process giving birth to a new collective. But I would like to underline, deeper
than Lindahl, the contingency of the constitutive process and the possibility to reverse it. It is
not possible to take for granted that, once a 'We" is constituted, it will remain the same forever.
The identity of a collective is "temporalized," and its membership could change at any time. For
this argumentation, see Hans Lindahl, We and Cyberlaw: The Spatial Unity of Constitutional
Orders, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 697 (2013); Riccardo Prandim, The Morphogenesis of
Constitutionalism, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALIsM?, supra note 1, at 309 (arguing
that it is necessary to talk about processes of constitutional morphogenesis which give rise to
new forms or maintain old forms).
134. Ellis, supra note 132.
135. It seems to me that in his contribution in this Issue, Larry CatA Backer too underlines
the relevance of introducing a dynamic element to explain societal constitutionalism. He clearly
recognizes that self-referential governance communities and collegial institutions may change
and need to work out and maintain their identities "in time." See Larry Cata Backer,
Transnational Corporations' Outward Expression of Inward Self-Constitution: The Enforcement
of Human Rights by Apple, Inc., 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 805 (2013).
136. Renner, supra note 41.
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stakeholders participating in the proceeding present themselves as
representative. That is why Renner concludes his paper by saying that
the public consultation process can thus be considered a reflection of an
emerging (and ongoing) political discourse on the global stage.
What is at stake here, in the present future of IASB, is neither the
construction of a permanent and immutable authority, nor a definitive
and everlasting standard, nor even the ultimate definition of the
organization's members. Instead, what is needed is only the ongoing
research and realization of temporary "agreements," or what Luhmann
calls "understandings," i.e. negotiated provisos that can be relied upon
for a given time.
They do not imply consensus, nor do they represent
reasonable or even correct solutions to problems . . .
Understandings have one big advantage over the claims
of authority: they cannot be discredited but must be
constantly renegotiated . . . Negotiations can then be
defined as an attempt to increase uncertainty to the
point that the only option that remains is understanding
one another.137
The relevance of the contingency and the temporal fluidity of
ongoing constitutional processes is also stressed by Chris Thornhill in
his most recent works.138 In a high-speed society the need of
juridification grows, and the new globalized or international polities
have to generate legitimacy in a rapidly iterated manner. By referring
to rights, emerging polities are able to restore, together with legality,
simple forms of legitimacy. The function of those globally localized
political systems-deciding in a collectively binding way so as to include
as many new citizens as possible-needs to be more flexible. Thornhill
affirms that it is the system of law, with its internal reference to rights,
that enables the building of temporary political structures. In
contemporary society, highly abstracted rights are the response to the
rising demands for highly contingent inclusion. Political inclusion needs
to be performed at a very high level of abstraction, contingency, and
precarious variability. This leading function of law in shaping politics
explains why political objectives can be fluidly allocated to a variety of
institutions, and various organizations can assume constituted status as
distinctively public or political. Thus, it is rights that constitute actors
137. LUHMANN, supra note 56, at 69-70.
138. E.g., Chris Thornhill, Re-Conceiving Rights Revolutions: The Persistence of a
Sociological Deficit in Theories of Rights, 31 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE [JOURNAL OF
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW] 177 (2010) (Ger.).
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and organizations as political and not the other way around. Legislation
is replaced by jurisdiction and judicialization, legislatures by unelected
and variable actors, public parliaments by private courts, and states by
networked actors. Transnational rights have assumed the
polity-building functions once accorded to the sovereign. The modern
semantics and structures prizing stability and certainty are replaced by
the values of contingency and determinability.
The second example has to do with the growing relevance of (not
national) courts as "centers" and "injectors" of societal
constitutionalization. 139 Courts are not only relevant because they
anticipate the consensus of the actors involved in dispute resolution
connecting them to a legal and self-sustaining proceeding; they are
decisive because only in court is it possible to make rapid decisions
about dispute resolution, thus speeding up the mutation of the present
future uncertainties into a more certain future present. In that sense,
decision-making is a technique to defuturize time. As we have seen in a
previous paragraph, with the acceleration of society and the rushed and
hasty new temporal semantic of "deadlines," the function of courts has
changed. From the second half of the sixteenth century, the role played
by legislation increased. At that time, legislation was conceived as a
sovereign "principal," whereas courts were understood as "agents"
charged with executing legislation. But at the beginning of the
twentieth century, this well-established hierarchy changed, and
judge-made law became accepted as a source of law of a special kind.
The relationship between legislation and judicial review became
dangerously circular. The last "fiction" that sustained the hierarchy in
which "the judge is bound to the law" collapses because of the
autoreferential closure of the legal system: the legislator is also bound
to law.
Luhmann helps us to understand this metamorphosis in term of
forms of social differentiation. 140 The internal differentiation of the legal
system cannot be conceived as a hierarchy or a segmental system. In
conditions of global, social, and temporal complexity, it takes the
center-periphery form. Courts occupy the center as banks do in the
economic system. Nowadays, it is parliaments, lawyers, and contracts
that occupy the periphery of the system; this is because they are not
139. See SCHEUERMAN, supra note 69, at 71-105. See generally JEAN L. COHEN,
GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY: RETHINKING LEGALITY, LEGITIMACY, AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2012); INTERNATIONAL JuDIcIAL LAWMAKING: ON PUBLIc AUTHORITY AND
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke
eds., 2012).
140. See LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 274-305 (discussing the position of courts in the
legal system).
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subjected to compulsory decision-making. Only courts have to decide to
reduce the uncertainties of law. And that is why the periphery is
particularly suited as a point of contact with other subsystems. This is
the new space where legal pluralism can evolve. As Alec Stone Sweet
explains, the various international or global courts (e.g. the Appellate
Body of the World Trade Organization, the European Court of Justice of
the European Union, and the European Court of Human Rights),
conceived as legal "zone of discretion," are more authoritative than most
national courts. Stone Sweet conceptualizes these zones as determined
by the sum of powers delegated to, and possessed by, the court as a
result of its own rulemaking through the building of precedents minus
the sum of control instruments available for use by nonjudicial
authorities to shape or to counter the outcomes of the court's
performance. With these powers, the courts "will come to exercise more
influence over the evolution of the [new global] polity."141 Of course, the
distinction between center and periphery does not mean a hierarchy of
value or a new source of law-the courts cannot give orders to the
legislators. The relevance of courts depends instead on "temporal
urgency" and on the duty to take decisions that may resolve, in the
present time, disputes. Courts have to decide what is legal or illegal and
cannot avoid upholding justice. 142 The expected norm is the prohibition
of the denial of justice. It is worth noting that only courts are obliged to
transform indeterminacy into determinacy and only courts have to
fictitiously reconstruct the availability of principles where necessary.
This growing relevance of courts was fueled by the emergence of
constitutions that placed them in subverting positions because the
courts now have to decide on the constitutionality of legislative
procedures and outputs. The other function of courts, to supervise the
consistency of legal decisions by means of interpretation and judicial
review, is equally relevant in high-speed society because it arranges a
special second-order observation of law that decides, step-by-step and
moment-by-moment, its validity.
The third and final example of the relevance of time and
acceleration in processes of global constitutionalization is given by the
growing importance of human rights. The argument is linear: "There
cannot be any doubt that the global society has a legal order, even if it
does not have a central legislation and decision-making. Among the
most important indicators of a global legal system is the increasing
141. Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes,
16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 640 (2009).
142. See Christopher Thornhill, A Sociology of Constituent Power: The Political Code of
Transnational Societal Constitutions, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 551 (2013).
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attention paid to the violation of human rights."1 43 When does this
central relevance begin? It is due to the fact that those violations seem
to be "immediately" illegal, without any time-consuming practices to
start assessing them. What one can observe is a very fast way of
generating norms on the basis of scandals and incidents. As Luhmann
notes, the almost self-evident force of human rights accelerates the
emergence of shared and valid norms at maximum overdrive. 144
Last but not least, "[o]ne who reacts indignantly and expresses
counterfactual expectations in such cases does not have to reckon with
dissent-almost as though the meaning of the norm was vouched for by
sacred powers."1 45 From this point of view, human rights can be
conceived as self-constructed "external" reference points for the
constitutionalization of global society. In a society where everything
becomes contingent and differently possible so that the past is
irrelevant for deciding what is "right" and "suitable" and the future
remains unknown, global society needs to find something unconditional.
This is the function of law as the immune system of society for
intercepting and neutralizing unpredicted disturbances, which develop
in the area of structural couplings.146 A system cannot have
countermeasures ready for a point-to-point defense. The immune system
registers internal conflicts and develops case-by-case solutions that then
can be generalized. Generalizations are normative rules for conflict
resolution that uses their time-binding effect to securely maintain the
future just when they are factually disappointed.
"[T]he formulation of rules is like the generation of antibodies for
specific cases." 147 Here, the cases concern the violations of human
dignity, where asymmetries of roles (tolerated inside functional
subsystems) become fixed and are treated as irreversible by a reference
to an outside.148 This irreversible negativity needs to be contrasted with
an irreversible positivity: the idea that human dignity is "forever"
temporally irreversible, "unconditional," not time-dependent, and out of
time. Actually, this "forever" means the necessity to keep the future
open for the diverse autopoietic reproductions of respective subsystems.
Human rights are simultaneously enabling and constraining because
"[n]o distribution, no classification, and above all no political sorting of
143. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 481-82.
144. See Niklas Luhmann, Are There Still Indispensable Norms in Our Society?, 14
SOZIALE SYSTEME 18, 26 (2008).
145. Luhmann, supra note 25, at 33.
146. Id. at 475-79.
147. Id. at 477.
148. See LUHMANN, supra note 25, at 486-87.
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people can limit the future."149 The future must not begin because it has
to remain open to possibilities. The increasingly crucial function played
by human rights in the process of global constitutionalization might be
interpreted as the necessary presence of "values" in the environment of
the law's system. The value of human dignity may represent the
transcendent formula of contingency (a kind of "stop rule") "invented" to
contrast the uncontrollable releasing of new and unexpected social
powers and immunize society against them:150 the impossible condition
of possibility for law (the "inconditionality" that fund every conditioned
laws).
It is not a mere coincidence that as an "autological" text, a
constitution always needs to be interpreted bilinguistically, from the
"inside" and "outside" of the coupling, as something unconditional over
and above everything that is conditional, something necessary beyond
everything that is contingent. We speak of basic rights when we refer to
justiciability; we speak of basic values when we need to legitimize the
legal system:
Reference to justiciability corresponds with the central
position of the courts in the legal system. The semantics
of values makes it clear that the meaning of the validity
of law is not exhausted but can claim to have a higher
level of meaning which lies beyond fluctuating
validities-in modern terms, civil society-in which the
necessary foundations can be found. 151
Again, courts and human rights-the horizontal and vertical layers
of constitutions-are mediated by new (self)constituent-constituted
societal powers, where consensus has to be created by means of
"political" argumentations. In the end, constitutionalism and
constitutions remain necessary as fictive eigenvalues permitting the
structural coupling between (societal) law and politics. But referring to
the needful eigenvalues does not mean the "end of history"; it offers no
guarantees against the growing and never-ending production of social
149. Id. at 135.
150. E.g., JACQUES DERRIDA & ANNE DUFOURMANTELLE, OF HOSPITALITY (Rachel Bowlby
trans., 2000); Riccardo Prandini, Re-vealing (vs Un-veiling) Justice. Riflessioni sull'enigma della
giustizia trans-immanente [Reflections on the Enigma of Transnational Justice], in
SOZIOLOGISCHE JURISPRUDENZ: FESTSCHRIFT FOR GUNTHER TEUBNER ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG
[SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE. COMMEMORATIVE PUBLICATION FOR GUNTHER TEUBNER'S
65TH BIRTHDAY], supra note 38, at 309; Gunther Teubner, Self-subversive Justice: Contingency
or Transcendence Formula of Law?, 72 MOD. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (arguing that justice is "the
subversive practice(] of law's self-transcendence.").
151. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 446.
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risks and dangers: "What remains is the replacement of the known past
with the unknown future as a constant, continuously operating premiss.
What remains is the ongoing creation of contingencies as stable
eigenvalues, as recursively renewed values of the legal system." 152 In the
age of high-speed societies, constitutions are necessary and increasingly
improbable. Constitutions oscillate between the value of stability
(duration) and instability (change). They need to be maintained but
increasingly amended. They have to freeze the future (time-binding
function) but only to keep it open. They need to overcome their
state-nation's embeddedness, only to generalize their features to other
self-constituent "we." In this shaky situation, global civil constitutions,
propelled by a huge production of rights, may develop into virtual social
containers in which various collective polities could "connect" to operate
legally and with political (collective) objectives. Here "political" means
only with the ability to adopt binding decisions for a whatever
self-constituting "we." In this sense the metacode of constitutionality
could move from the permanent values of "inclusionlexclusion" toward
the more flexible and contingent code of "connected/unconnected." This
may change the idea of constitutionalism, shifting it from a spatial
qualification to a temporal one. The decision to connect with this virtual
legal space (and its constitutional tool box) may become a contingent
decision. The only rule will be that if an actor decides to connect with
the virtual constitution (the peculiar global regime), then he shall
respect its rules and metarules. And this will be necessary to operate in
a legal way together with other actors in a legalized social sphere. If the
actor decides to disconnect, he shall do so, paying the price of operating
outside the system with a growing difficulty to reaccess the virtual legal
regime.
152. Id. at 455 (emphasis added).
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